


26 January 1976

NIO/SP BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR MR. BUSH

A NIO/SP Production Methods



H Concerns Expressed by the PFIAB

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NOTE: Chairmen, where appropriate, are shown in parens.

14 December 1975


WHO DOES WHATIn Soviet Strategic Estimates and SALT Support

	STRATEGIC ESTIMATES	SALT POSITIONS	SALT NEGOTIATIONS	SALT MONITORING	COMPLIANCE ISSUES	SCC
<u>POLICY LEVEL</u>						
Primary Consumers	NSC and NSC Staff	NSC NSC Ver. Panel (Kissinger)	US SALT Delegation (Johnson)	NSC and NSC Staff	NSC NSC Ver. Panel (Kissinger)	US Component SCC (Graybeal)
Intell. Representatives	DCI	DCI Duckett	Stoertz CIA and DIA Assistants	DCI 25X1	DCI Duckett	<input type="text"/> DIA Assistant as required
<u>SALT COMMUNITY LEVEL</u>						
Working Committees	--	VP Working Group (NSC Staff)	Backstopping Committee (Graybeal)	-- 25X1	Special VP Wkg Group (25X1nd)	Backstopping Committee (Timbie)
Intell. Representatives	---	Duckett <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	25X1 --	Duckett 25X1 <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<u>INTELL. COMMUNITY LEVEL</u>						
USIB Review	USIB	--	--	USIB Steering Group (Gen. Walters)	25X1 25X1	25X1 --
Intell. Supervision	Stoertz	Duckett	Stoertz	Proctor	Duckett	<input type="text"/>
Intell. Working Level	USIB Repre- sentatives CIA Manager Interagency Teams	CIA Produc- tion Offices DIA & State as required	CIA & DIA Production Offices	SALT Monitor- ing Wkg Group <input type="text"/> CIA & DIA Pro- duction Offices	CIA Production Offices DIA & State as required	CIA Productio Offices DIA & State a required

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NIO/SP PRODUCTION PROGRAM


On Strategic Forces and Capabilities



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METHODS OF PREPARING ESTIMATES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES




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
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Tailoring the Product to Consumer Needs, 1974


NSC Principals




NSC Staff,
Senior Planners,
SALT Community



Those with
Specialized
Concerns



Defense Planning
Staffs




Key Judgements and Summary

- Current Strategic Situation
- Soviet Strategic Policy and Objectives
- Forces for Inter-continental Attack and Defense
- Future Forces and their Implications
- 1975-85

The Estimate

- Basis for Future Projections
- Best Estimate Under SALT Interim Agreement
- Alternative Future Forces
- Survivability of Selected US and Soviet Components
- Implications for Future Strategic Environment



- More Detailed Quantitative Projections
- Manning Levels and Support Requirements
- Semi-Annual Revisions

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

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August 8, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

The National Intelligence Estimates should be among the most important documents issued by the intelligence community. They are the natural backdrop to guide the Department of Defense in formulating force levels and R&D programs, and should serve Congress in their authorization and appropriation hearings. Certain of them also serve as the foundations from which to derive arms limitation negotiating positions. Underlying each of these objectives is the presumption that the NIE will substantially influence the thought processes of key Government decision-makers regarding Soviet military capabilities.

In our view, NIE 11-3/8-74 ("Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985") is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence, it is deficient for the purposes it should serve.

This NIE assesses that for the next ten years it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets will conclude they could launch an attack which would prevent devastating U. S. retaliation. This judgment is presented confidently, with the force of fact, although the cumulative evidence on which it is based is conflicting, often flimsy, and in certain cases does not exist:

-- With respect to Soviet ICBM accuracy and the survivability of the U. S. MINUTEMAN force, the data is inconclusive and has been very differently interpreted by the experts. A number of uncertainties which have puzzled analysts for six years have been accommodated in the NIE by averaging the worst and best cases when the data could readily support either interpretation;

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EX
EMPTION CATEGORY (S) 37 (1), (2), (3) 37 (1)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Infinite to Continuing
(Directives Date of 01-01-81)

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Observations on the Intelligence Estimating Process

The root cause of the problems experienced both by the intelligence community and the users of intelligence is the lack of factual evidence and the difficulty of forecasting ten years into the future. Because of the importance attached to some intelligence subjects, there is an understandable desire to fill some of the intelligence holes with judgments. These judgments can then gain an acceptance approaching fact, and can then lead both the intelligence community and the users of intelligence into a single viewpoint which rejects alternatives, and can persist too long. Only when some surprise arises, totally contrary to the intelligence trend, is the pattern broken and another "review" ordered of the intelligence effort.

When decisions must be made, they are almost always based on incomplete information. When they involve intelligence information, the decision-maker should wish to know not only the facts but also the best judgments of the intelligence community and have some feeling for the uncertainties connected with these conclusions, including other possible situations consistent with the data. These uncertainties should lead the decision-maker to consider whether he should hedge his bets or to be prepared for possible reverses connected with failures of actions (or inactions) based on these assessments.

This is not an easy process; no one knows how to weigh judgmental uncertainties. For this reason we look upon the process of attempting

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to analyze and communicate uncertainties in the area of national assessment as a process with which we must continue to ~~improve~~ trying various modes in an attempt to find a more satisfactory procedure. This leads us to the following suggestions:

Suggestions for Resolving Observed Deficiencies

I. Those aspects of intelligence which are considered critical by key decision-makers should be subject to separate and competitive analyses and such alternate views as are developed should be presented to the President and other users. In our view, this suggestion deserves the highest priority for consideration and implementation.

II. To avoid the tendency of decision-makers to force the intelligence community to come up with positions when the data is too meager, the following suggestion may be helpful. The user should formulate his alternative choices of action in such a way as to permit the intelligence community to marshal its evidence around each alternative. Thus, the community would be asked to make its best case that we face a serious problem, and its best case that we do not.

The purpose of this suggestion is to try to maintain an awareness of the limitations in the intelligence information. In addition, it stimulates the user to provide important feedback to the intelligence community on his interests and problems which, in turn, can motivate the intelligence community to provide a more complete and useful product to the user.

III. NIE 11-3/8-74 has the tendency to phrase the estimate as a net assessment, that is, to include an assessment of U. S. capabilities in the face of the threat in question. We suggest that the National Security Council adopt a three-step process. The first step is the generation of a purely intelligence document, the NIE, which carefully avoids the impression that a net assessment has been performed. The second step would involve a genuine net assessment, requiring participation by both the intelligence community and other agencies (Department of Defense, State, etc.), under the aegis of the NSC. The third and final step would involve a thorough critique of the net assessment document for the NSC by an entity which is enabled to function with an appropriate degree of independence.

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Summary

We believe that the policy-maker would be better served by an NIE which clearly identifies that which is fact and that which is judgment, and which identifies the intelligence gaps prevailing at various stages in the analytic process. The product would also be more useful if the decision-makers provided more specific guidance regarding the relevant, contemporary issues with which they are confronted, and on the most useful format for presentation of the intelligence.

Finally, Mr. President, we recommend that you direct the NSC to implement these suggestions, insofar as possible, with respect to formulation of this year's NIE on Soviet Strategic Forces which is now in progress and, as appropriate, to the national intelligence estimating process.

Respectfully,

George W. Anderson, Jr.
George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Chairman

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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